

Interagency Group/Countermeasures

Washington, D.C. 20505

11 JAN 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members and Invitees
Interagency Group/Countermeasures

FROM: General Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret.)
Chairman


SUBJECT: Terms of Reference, NSSD-2/82 Countermeasure
Organizational Study

25X1 1. The DCI, in his capacity as Chairman, NSC/SIG-I, has directed me to
conduct a study of the organizational and structural impediments to achieving
required capabilities for detecting, analyzing and countering the non-HUMINT
foreign intelligence threat to the United States. This study is to be
submitted to the SIG-I which, after appropriate consideration, will forward it
to the NSC and the President. [redacted]

25X1 2. I have named [redacted] of the Intelligence Community Staff's
Community Counterintelligence Staff as Study Director, to be assisted by
representatives to be designated by recipient addressees. It is expected that
agency representatives will vary depending on the particular study topic being
addressed, but each agency should initially identify a principal
25X1 representative/focal point [redacted]

25X1 3. Draft terms of reference and study outline are attached. Your
representatives should be prepared to discuss these at an initial meeting of
the overall Study Group which will be scheduled later in January 1983. [redacted]

25X1 Attachment:
a/s


Richard G. Stilwell

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25X1 CCIS/ICS [redacted]

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Distribution (all w/atts):

- 1 - Gen. Stilwell, OSD
- 5 - Mr. Snider, OSD (to be distributed to Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps)
- 1 - Mr. Yee, FBI
- 1 - [redacted] CIA
- 1 - Mr. Sherry, State
- 1 - [redacted] NSA
- 1 - Mr. deGraffenreid, NSC
- 1 - [redacted] DIA (for JCS)
- 1 - [redacted] SECDEF
- 1 - Ms. Lawton, DOJ
- 1 - Mr. McBrien, Treasury
- 1 - Mr. Peterson, Commerce
- 1 - Mr. Ritchie, Energy
- 1 - Transportation
- 1 - NASA
- 1 - D/ICS
- 1 - [redacted] OGC
- 1 - CCIS subject
- 1 - C/CCIS chrono

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TERMS OF REFERENCENSSD-2/82 COUNTERMEASURE ORGANIZATIONAL STUDYI. Task Assigned by the Chairman, SIG-I

The DCI, in his capacity as Chairman, NSC/SIG-I, has directed the Chairman, Interagency Group/Countermeasures (IG/CM) to undertake a study of the organizational and structural impediments to achieving required capabilities for detecting, analyzing and countering the non-HUMINT foreign intelligence threat to the United States. This countermeasures organizational review is a companion to the counterintelligence organizational study being conducted by the Chairman, Interagency Group/Counterintelligence, at similar DCI behest.

II. Background

This organizational tasking was originally called for in National Security Study Directive No. 2 of 16 February 1982, but was deferred with NSC consent to give priority to the coverage achieved via "Capabilities Against the Hostile Intelligence Threat, 1983-1988."

The nature and extent of the non-HUMINT hostile intelligence threats to be countered have been detailed in successive periodic national threat and countermeasure assessments and in the "Capabilities" study. Policy, resource, legal and guideline impediments to fully effective countermeasures are also provided in that "Capabilities" study.

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III. Scope

Unlike counterintelligence, which involves essentially only those agencies responsible for major segments of the HUMINT threat and is being treated organizationally as a whole, countermeasures include the counters to a wide range of different technical threats and a wide range of differing security measures.

Technical threats of concern include SIGINT collection from land, sea, subsurface, air and space platforms; IMINT (imagery) from sea, air and space platforms; ACOUSTINT and non-ACOUSTINT from subsurface, sea and air platforms; LASINT; etc.

Security measures are equally varied. As an umbrella, they constitute OPSEC (operations security) and include personnel security, information security, physical security, technical surveillance countermeasures, TEMPEST proofing against intentional and unintentional radiations, industrial security, computer security, and communications security.

Such threat differentiation and the concomitant countermeasure differentiation means that organizational and structural effectiveness can only be assessed by reviewing each countermeasure situation separately. Therefore, while the issue of a major new organization centralizing all disparate countermeasure responsibilities should be reviewed, the realities of this situation dictate, in effect, that the concern of this study be with fine tuning existing countermeasure structures and relationships.

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Fine tuning requires that key countermeasure organizational issues and problems be identified and separately reviewed and assessed.

IV. Methodology

The Chairman, IG/CM, has appointed a study director who will develop a study outline in consultation with the agencies involved. Contributions to the study will be obtained on the basis of that outline. Guidance for the study director will be provided by the Chairman, IG/CM, or his designated representative. To assist in the assessment of specific countermeasure organizational issues, the study director may hold ad hoc working group meetings of members from involved departments or agencies. The IG/CM will review the draft of the study. Where full agreement cannot be achieved, minority views will be footnoted.

V. Outline for Countermeasure Organizational Study

(Note: A sub-outline applicable to each of the topics herein is appended.)

A. Introduction

B. Warning Mechanisms Against Hostile Technical Collectors

1. Space Collectors
2. Air Collectors
3. Sea Collectors
4. Subsurface Collectors

C. Technical Collection Countermeasures

1. Communications Security Programs
2. Computer Security Programs
3. Camouflage and Concealment Programs
4. Port Security Programs
5. Civil Overflight Security Programs
6. TEMPEST Programs
7. OPSEC Programs
8. Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Programs

D. General Security Countermeasures

1. Personnel Security Programs
2. Information Security Programs
3. Physical Security Programs
4. Industrial Security Programs

E. Summary Possibilities for Improvement of Existing Countermeasure
Agency Structures

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F. Existing Countermeasure Superstructure

1. Organizational Structure and Relationships
 - a. NSC
 - b. SIG-I
 - c. IG/CM
 - d. National Multidisciplinary Counterintelligence Assessment Center
2. Possibilities for Improvement

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Appendix to Outline

Sub-Outline for Each "B," "C" and "D" Topic of
Countermeasure Organizational Study

A. Organizational Structure and Responsibilities

1. Who are the players?
2. What is the mission?
3. What is the authority/policy--statutory, Executive Orders, guidelines, directives?
4. How is analysis handled organizationally?
5. How is countermeasure implementation handled organizationally?
6. How and under what program(s) is/are resources provided/obtained?
7. What are the internal agency organizational strengths?
8. And organizational weaknesses?
9. What are the problem areas?

B. Relationships of Agencies

1. Operational
2. Provision/exchange of information
3. Analysis
4. Implementation
5. Strengths and weaknesses
6. Problem areas

C. Personnel Acquisition, Training and Advancement

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D. Improvement of Existing Countermeasure Structure

1. Internal structure, mission and authority
2. Countermeasure implementation
3. Provision of resources

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